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The notion of salience was developed by Schelling in the context of the meeting-
place problem of locating a partner in the absence of a pre-agreed meeting place.
In this paper, we argue that a realistic specication of the meeting place problem
involves allowing a strategy of active search over a range of possible meeting places.
We solve this extended problem, allowing for extensions such as repeated play,
search costs and asymmetric payos. The result is a considerably richer, but more
complex, notion of salience.
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1 Introduction
focal
conceives
However, you will probably disagree as to how precisely common knowledge is achieved.
You have arranged to meet in Washington DC on a certain day, a friend who is a holder of
a recent PhD in Economics. Unfortunately, you have neglected to specify a meeting place
or a time. What should you do? Your friend will undoubtedly recognise this problem as
a classic example of a co-ordination problem, rst examined in detail by Schelling (1960),
and may be expected to pursue the solution proposed by Schelling | pick the most salient
point in Washington and wait there at noon. If you follow the same strategy, and you
make the same judgement as to the most salient point, that is, if the point is for
the two of you, then you will meet. Unfortunately, Washington oers a number of salient
points. The Washington monument is most salient in the literal sense, but the White
House, the Capitol and the Lincoln Memorial are obvious alternatives. For suciently
obsessive economists, even the Brookings Institute or one of its competitors might stake
a claim. Hence, there exists the possibility that you will fail to co-ordinate. Fortunately,
there is a way to do better. If you know that your friend will pursue the salient point
strategy and the set of salient points is suciently small, you can guarantee a meeting
simply by visiting each of the salient points in turn.
The above discussion highlights the importance in a game theoretic analysis of the
specication of the strategy sets for each player as this species how each of
their own and their opponents’ range of possible actions. In this case by considering
the possibility of adopting the additional action of active search guarantees the desired
meeting, given the belief that the friend is choosing one from a number of salient points
at which to wait. Unfortunately, there is a possibility that the same thoughts will occur
to your friend. Once this happens, given the training of both players, progression to
a full common knowledge solution is inevitable. The equilibrium in which each player
believes the other is randomly choosing between engaging in active search and picking
a salient point at which to wait is the one that seems most in accord with the strategic
uncertainty of this situation. Although the (symmetric) extension of the each player’s
strategy set has not removed the possibility of failing to meet in the associated mixed
strategy equilibrium, it is relatively easy to show that the expected likelihood of meeting
is increased.
There is, in fact, a real-life problem that most people have encountered (unlike the
articial one set out at the beginning of this paper). Having lost contact with your partner
in a large public place, how should you go about nding them? An added feature of this
particular meeting problem is that the \game" may last many periods with the benet
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2 The Pure Co-ordination Game
For a treatment of ‘cheap’ talk in coordination games see Farrell (1988).
of meeting (weakly) decreasing in the length of time with which it is achieved. At least,
in the authors’ experience, the strategy usually adopted consists of alternate periods of
waiting at salient points and of rapidly searching as many such points as possible. When
the meeting is achieved, it is usually found that several points have been visited by both
parties in the course of the search.
In the following section we present a stylized model of the meeting place problem
(a ‘pure-coordination’ game) where the choice of salient point is determined from the
model’s informational structure rather than any pre-game communication or so-called
‘cheap talk’. The alternative salient points may be viewed, in the terminology of Sugden
(1995), as alternative ways of ‘labelling’ the available actions.
This approach enables us to assign an expected value for picking a salient point and
contrast it with the situation where one or both of the players conceives of the alternative
of engaging in active search. As foreshadowed above, including the strategy of active
search increases the likelihood of meeting in the mixed strategy equilibrium. Section
extends the model to the situation where repeated plays may be available to eect a
meeting. In accord with natural intuition, we show that the probability of playing active
search (at least initially) and the value of the (stationary) mixed strategy equilibrium
to both players increase with the likelihood that another play in the next period will be
available (or equivalently with the patience of both players). We present a ‘battle of the
sexes’ extension of the basic model in section where although meeting is still desirable,
the two players may have conicting preferences as to which salient point they wish to
meet at. Further discussion and applications of the asymmetric case are considered in
section . In particular we highlight Schelling’s point that ‘pre-game play’ by a player
may introduce asymmetries to increase the salience of a desired outcome thereby favouring
an apparently weaker player.
We rst analyze a pure coordination problem with two salient points. Players and
are drawn from a population of two types. For type 1, occurring with probability , point
1 is the more salient, and conversely, point 2 is more salient for type 2. The distribution
of types, given by the parameter , is unknown to both players, however. Instead, each
player begins with a prior distribution of such that each type is equally probable and
uses their own type as a signal for . Hence, if they follow the salient point strategy, they
will choose the point more salient for themselves in the belief that this point is the one
most likely to be focal. That is, in our formal model below, the Bayesian updated value
of for a player of type 1 (respectively, type 2) will be greater than (respectively, less
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We might defend this assumption by appealing to a ‘principle of insu cient reason.’
For each strategy combination, the entry in the bottom left hand corner is the payo to player (the
\row" player) and the entry in the top right hand corner is the payo to player (the \column" player).
than) one-half. So a player’s best guess as to what is more salient for the other player is
what is more salient for herself.
In the terminology of Sugden (1995), we can interpret the two types as corresponding
to two possible ways the players can the two salient points: more or less salient to
them. These two ways of labelling the points may well depend upon psychological and
cultural factors and so reect what is salient to the individuals. Importantly,
they reasoning. Our focus, as it is in Sugden, is the question: given the players’
types and their information or beliefs about how those types are determined or related,
what choices are rational for them to make?
For concreteness, we will assume that the prior distribution on is uniform on [0 1].
The conditional joint probability distribution of the two individuals’ types can be repre-
sented in the following matrix where the ( ) element is the probability that individual
is of type and individual is of type :
1 2
1 (1 )
2 (1 ) (1 )
The complete payo matrix for a player is
0 1 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
However, given that a player will never follow the strategy of waiting at the salient
point less favored for themselves, the game may be reduced to one of two strategies, active
(search) and (waiting at) salient (point). Notice that the unconditional joint distribution
is
1 2
1 1 3 1 6
2 1 6 1 3
Hence Pr [ = 1 = 1] = Pr [ = 2 = 2] = 2 3. Given that player is engaging in an
active search strategy, the payo to player of choosing the point more salient to him
is 1 (while of course engaging in active search as well pays o 0). Alternatively, given
that player is choosing the point more salient to her, can expect a payo of 1 from
actively searching. If both choose their most salient point, then the expected payo is
2 3 { the conditional probability that they view the same salient point as the relatively
more salient (or, equivalently, the probability that a player’s own more salient point is
focal). The expected payos for the two players in the reduced form game are thus
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This game is similar in general form to what Binmore (1992, p339) has called ‘the
Australian battle of the sexes’. It has two asymmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies
and a Pareto-inferior (Bayes-Nash) equilibrium in mixed strategies where each engages
(or believes that the other engages) in active search with probability 1 4. Given the
informational structure of our model and without further reason to discriminate between
the individuals and their choice of actions, we shall treat the mixed strategy equilibrium
outcome as the equilibrium (expected) outcome most reasonable to predict or anticipate
for both the outside analyst and the players themselves at the time when they are reason-
ing about how they should play. This choice is consistent with a justication advanced
by Binmore for considering mixed strategy equilibria in problems of this kind. Possibil-
ities for generating asymmetry and thereby making possible of one of the pure strategy
equilibria are discussed in the next section.
Although stylized, this game form does allow us to address the interesting welfare
question of whether the availability of the active search strategy reduces or increases
welfare. It is clear from inspection of the payo matrix above that welfare is increased if
active search is available only to one player. Indeed active search is a dominant strategy
for that player and by engaging in active search a meeting is guaranteed. Active search
available to both players also increases welfare. To see this, suppose both players initially
play pure Salient. A move to any mixed strategy (including the Bayes-Nash equilibrium
mixed strategy) by Player must increase welfare, since the active strategy is always
successful. But by denition, the equilibrium mixed strategy for player must be equally
as good as the pure Salient strategy given that player is (or is believed by player
to be) following the Bayes-Nash equilibrium mixed strategy. Algebraically the expected
payo to the Bayes-Nash equilibrium mixed strategy where each player engages in active
search with probability 1 4 is 3 4. Hence the dierence between these equilibrium payo
and both players choosing to wait at their more salient point is 1 12.
Suppose we now allow the possibility of a series of plays, with the payo for both players
decreasing in the number of plays required before meeting is achieved. As soon as a round
occurs in which both players choose Salient, they will either meet (if they have the same
type) or fail to meet (if they have dierent types). After a failure to meet, it is common
knowledge that the two players are of dierent types. From this point on, neither has
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Note that, unlike Crawford and Haller (1990), players in our model do not ‘learn’ to cooperate with
repeated rounds of play. In particular we do not allow players to use past plays as ‘precedents’ with
which they can achieve coordination.
any a priori reason for believing either of the salient points is a more likely candidate on
which the two will coordinate a meeting if they both decide to wait at a salient point.
Of course, the two pure strategy combinations where both go to the same salient point
remain Nash equilibrium actions for any round of the game. We contend, however, that
the ‘salient’ equilibrium belief for each of the two players (given their information) is that
an individual playing salient is likely to choose either salient point. Thus the
probability of meeting in a given play, given the belief that the other is playing salient, is
reduced to 1 2. Although the notion of common knowledge is somewhat problematic in
relation to the question of salience, it would appear that a similar analysis would apply
when both players’ types are common knowledge at the beginning of the game. If the
types are the same the salient point strategy is optimal. If they are dierent, the analysis
presented above implies the chance of meeting in that round if both are playing salient is
1 2.
To analyze formally the repeated play extension, suppose that the value of meeting
in the th round is with in (0 1). We can interpret as either the (common)
discount factor of the two players (that is, their degree of ‘patience’) or the probability
that there will be another round of play if a meeting is not achieved in the current round.
We can characterize the (stationary or Markov Perfect) mixed strategy equilibrium by
two continuation payo matrices for the pure action combinations in any round of play.
We shall refer to rounds as being in one of two states. A round is in state if the
players’ types are private information. Alternatively, the round is in state if the types
are common knowledge and known to be dierent. Let (respectively, ) denote the
continuation payo of the a round in state (respectively, ).
In round 1, the each player’s type is known only to his or herself and so it is a round
in state with continuation payos given by:
1
1
1
1
+
+
If an asymmetric strategy combination is played a meeting is achieved and the game
ceases. If both play active search, then both know that the other was also engaged in
active search so neither learns anything more about the other’s type. Hence play for
the next round will remain in state . The expected equilibrium continuation payo for
both engaging in active search in a state round is thus . If both play Salient, the
probability that they meet (because they are of the same type) is 2 3. If they fail to
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meet then as we discussed in the paragraph above it is common knowledge that they are
of dierent types so the probability of meeting in any subsequent round given they both
play salient is reduced to 1 2. Play in the next round (and all subsequent rounds) will
be state . The expected payo to both playing salient in a round in state is thus
2 3 + 1 3 . The continuation payo matrix of a round in state is given by:
1
1
1
1
+
+
If we let (respectively, ) denote the stationary mixed strategy equilibrium prob-
ability that a player engages in active search in a state (respectively, state ) round,
then , , and are determined by the following four equations.
+ (1 ) = (1)
+ (1 )
1
2
+
1
2
= (2)
+ (1 ) = (3)
+ (1 )
2
3
+
1
3
= (4)
Given , the continuation expected value of playing in a state round, the rst
pair of equations denes the probability of engaging in active search by one player that
would make the other player indierent between playing active search or playing Salient
in a state round. Similarly, given and , the second pair of equations denes the
probability of engaging in active search by one player that would make the other player
indierent between playing active search or playing Salient in a state round. This
system yields the solution:
=
= 0
(0 1]
, =
1
3
, =
1
1
, =
2
3
(5)
It is immediately obvious from ( ) that the continuation expected value of playing
in a round of type is increasing in , the discount factor of both players, although the
equilibrium probability of playing active search in a round of type remains unchanged
at 1 3. Straightforward, but tedious, algebraic manipulation leads to:
=
2 (2 )
, =
[2 + (3 ) ]
2 (1 ) (2 )
Hence we have the intuitive comparative static results that both the (equilibrium) prob-
ability of playing active search in a state round and the continuation expected value of
playing in a state round are increasing in .
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4 Asymmetric Payos
We can also view a state 2 round as a one-round asymmetric game.
Now suppose that the active search strategy incurs costs. Small symmetrical costs
simply reduce welfare and the optimal frequency with which the active search strategy
is chosen. If, however, costs are asymmetric, in particular positive for player and
zero for player , then the asymmetric equilibrium in which player adopts active search
and player adopts a salient point becomes itself a equilibrium (that is, salient to
both players) and is Pareto-superior to the Bayes-Nash mixed strategy equilibrium and the
other asymmetric equilibrium. If all of this is common knowledge, it seems that the players
should be able to co-ordinate on this equilbrium without explicit communication. Note
that this conclusion does not seem to follow simply from the Nash equilibrium condition
or any obvious renement. Rather, at least in cases where mixed-strategy equilibria
are Pareto-dominated (so that players will not deliberately randomize even if they can)
salience undermines the main argument for considering mixed-strategy equilibria.
In the next section we turn to the case where the returns from the outcomes are no
longer perfectly aligned, that is, the game is no longer one of pure co-ordination.
In our asymmetric payo version the set-up is the same as for section except now the
payo to a player of meeting at the point less salient to him or her is 1 . This is a
simple parametrization that provides a convenient asymmetric extension of the original
pure coordination game of section . We can again reduce the rst round to two actions
{ active search and playing salient { since given players are using their own type as a
signal for there is even more reason to choose the point more salient to herself when
playing salient.
Although conceptually there is no diculty in proceeding as we did in section
and allowing potentially innite repeats of play until a meeting is achieved, for ease of
exposition and simplicity of algebraic derivation, we shall assume that only a second round
of play is available if a meeting is not achieved in the rst round.
As in the pure coordination game, in the rst round the players’ types are private
information. In the second round the players’ types remain private information if both
played active search in the rst round of play and common knowledge (and known to be
dierent) if a meeting was not achieved after both played salient in the rst round. We
shall refer to the former (respectively, the latter) as a state 2 (respectively, 2 ) round
with its (equilibrium) expected payo denoted by ( ).
Hence if both players play active search in the rst round they will each receive in
equilibrium the expected payo . If one plays active search and the other plays salient
then a meeting is guaranteed. But note that the while the payo to the one playing salient
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In the purely symmetric situation of the introduction, awareness that the other player may pursue
active search is virually equivalent to consideration of the same strategy for oneself. However, asymmetry
may arise from physical incapacity to search, social custom or bounded rationality. Some examples are
discussed below.
is 1, for the active searcher the probability of meeting at his or her more preferred point
is only leading to an expected payo of 1 . Finally if both play salient in the rst
round, the probability of meeting is and the probability of proceeding to a state 2
round is . Thus the expected payo of both playing salient is + for each. The
payo matrix for the rst round is thus
1
1
1
1
+
In terms of the parameters and the equilibrium continuation payos and , ,
the (symmetric mixed strategy) equilibrium probability of engaging in active search is
=
1
4 ( + )
(6)
The payo matrix for a state 2 round is the same as that for the rst round with
and set to zero as there are no further rounds. Thus, , the (symmetric mixed
strategy) probability of engaging in active search in a state 2 round can be expressed as
=
1
4
(7)
which yields an expected payo for a state 2 round of
=
3
4
(8)
As one would expect, from ( ) we can show that the (equilibrium) probability of engaging
in active search and the associated expected payo in a state 2 are both decreasing in
, the degree of (potential) divergence in player’s preferences.
An examination of the payo matrix for a state 2 round (a one-round [sub]game)
reveals the advantage of a player not possessing (or conceiving of) the active search
strategy when it is known that that strategy is available to her opponent. In this situation
regardless of types, the (iterative dominant) strategy equilibrium outcome secures 1 for
this ‘constrained’ player and only 1 3 for the player who actively searches. Either
being unimaginative (or viewed as such by one’s opponent) is a bonus in this situation, a
point on which we elaborate in section . Moreover, we have that
1 3 =
(3 ) (1 )
3 (4 )
0
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For a coordination game where the payos are qualitatively like the \battle of the sexes" and where
there is pre-game ‘cheap talk’ the reader is referred to Farrell (1987).
Hence players are better o when active search is available only to one player. This
is not that surprising since with only one player actively searching, a meeting is guaran-
teed. So even with the potential divergence of the players’ objectives the benet from
guaranteeing a meeting more than osets the increased likelihood that the searcher will
meet at their less preferred salient point.
The other possible second round state is a state 2 round that arises after a failure to
meet having played salient in the rst round. As it is now common knowledge that the
two players are of dierent types, the payo submatrix for the strategies combinations
(( )) is now a \battle of the sexes game". That is, the divergence in players’
preferences is now actual rather than potential. From this point on, neither individual
has any a priori reason for believing that either of the salient points is a more likely
candidate on which the two will coordinate a meeting if they both decide to wait at a
salient point. Of course, the two pure strategy combinations where both go to the same
salient point remain Nash equilibrium actions for this round of the game. We contend,
however, that the ‘salient’ equilibrium is the (‘symmetric’) mixed strategy equilibrium
where each engages in active search with probability ; and conditional on deciding to
wait at a salient point, picks the point more salient to herself with probability . In this
situation the choice of cannot be determined independently of the choice of , thus
we cannot collapse the two salient actions into one as was done in the private information
states above. The payo matrix for a state 2 round with the row player of type 1 and
the column player of type 2 is thus:
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
The mixed strategy equilibrium action and expected payo for this round is given by:-
=
1
(1 ) + (1 ) + 1
, =
1
(1 ) + 1
, =
(1 ) + (1 )
(1 ) + (1 ) + 1
(9)
>From ( ) and ( ) we can compute
1 + =
(1 ) (1 + 2 )
2 (2 + 2 )
, 1 =
(1 )
(3 + )
that is, the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium payo in a state 2 (respectively, 2 )
round is less than the payo of meeting at the player’s more (respectively, less) preferred
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A very similar example involving lists of cities is discussed by Kreps (1990).
salient point. Substituting these expressions into ( ) and ( ) we obtain:
=
(4 ) (1 ) (3 2 3 + + )
48 17 72 + 26 + 43 13 11
(10)
and thus , the expected equilibrium payo of the two-round asymmetric game is
=
132 48 213 + 77 + 129 39 33 + 6 + 3
3 (48 17 72 + 26 + 43 13 11 + 2 + )
(11)
As is the case for and , and are decreasing in . Increasing (potential)
divergence in payos makes active search a less desirable action to take, since by searching
one meets at the other’s more preferred point. is also decreasing in , but as one would
expect is increasing in , as the more patient the players are, the more valuable a second
round meeting becomes.
Following Schelling (1960) the analysis presented above may be applied to a range of
bargaining problems. Consider for example, a situation proposed by Schelling in which
two parties must agree to an exact partition of an area of land (say the Continental
United States) without communicating. In the case considered by Schelling, each party
has a single chance to write down a proposal. If the two proposals constitute a partition,
this is the agreement, otherwise both parties get nothing. Suppose however, that either
party may make proposals over a continuous nite interval. If for some nite period of
time during the interval, the two proposals represent a partition, this is the agreement.
Otherwise, both parties get nothing. If the parties are solely concerned with reaching
agreement on some partition, and they are indierent as to which partition is chosen, the
analysis of section applies. The one-shot game arises when the bargaining period is
just long enough for a player choosing active search to oer all the salient partitions. The
main modication is that there is some possibility of agreement even if both players play
active.
Next consider the case where players have diering preferences over partitions, which
may or may not be common knowledge. Schelling has observed in this context that one
player may obtain an advantage by pre-bargaining actions that increase the salience of her
preferred meeting point (or partition). For example, in the case of two parachutists co-
ordinating on a meeting place, the one who jumps rst may point to the preferred location
immediately before jumping. The analysis developed here suggests a generalisation of this.
A player may be able to pre-commit to playing Salient in general, without any specication
of the particular game or set of salient points under consideration. When such a game
10
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As in the general partition game, it is less clear what happens if the salient strategies do not clash
but leave some territory unclaimed
Farrell and Saloner (1988) also note that the ability of one party to make a unilateral and irrevocable
choice is a common mechanism employed to achieve coordination. They also analyse the situation where
both pre-play communication and unilateral preemptive actions are available.
arises, she can choose her most preferred Salient strategy in the knowledge that the
other player must choose Active. In the parachute case, for example, one parachutist
may conspicuously pack heavy equipment, thereby forgoing the Active strategy. As this
example indicates, the asymmetries in the situation may favor the apparently weaker
player.
A military version of the partition game arises when two armies confront each other,
both wishing to gain territory but also wishing to avoid an all-out battle. The salient
strategy is that of picking a defensible position and resisting all attacks on that posi-
tion. The active strategy is that of manoeuvre and probing attack, testing how much
ground the enemy is willing to yield. If both players choose the active strategy or if they
choose salient strategies that are incompatible in the sense that the claimed territories
are incompatible, an all-out battle will erupt. On the other hand, if compatible salient
strategies are chosen, or if one player chooses the active strategy and the other chooses
any salient strategy, battle will be avoided. It is apparent that, ceteris paribus, an ability
to precommit to playing Salient will be advantageous. If only one party can precommit to
Salient, she can choose from a number of possible Salient outcomes the one which is most
favorable to her. For the other party, playing Active will now be the preferred strategy.
In certain circumstances, it seems reasonable to suppose that the militarily weaker party
will have the ability to precommit to Salient, since he will normally be retreating and
can therefore choose where and when to take a stand. Note that, for plausible values
of the payos, both parties will be better o than in the situation where neither can
precommit.
Parent-child relationships (in which communication is notoriously dicult) provide
a related example. In general childen want more autonomy than their parents think is
desirable. Since all disputes over autonomy will eventually be resolved in favour of the
child, the parent is in the position of the weaker general. However, the advantage of
weakness is the ability to precommit to Salient. Standard professional advice is that
the parent should commit to a xed set of rules at each interaction (though these rules
will be relaxed over time). Since these rules can never be perfectly communicated, the
child should adopt the Active strategy of exploring ambiguities. The resolution arrived
at is likely to depend on the availability of appropriate salient points, such as the rules
that the parent experienced as a child, and the rules applying the members of the childs’
peer group. Bad outcomes occur if both parties play Salient; that is, back demands for
incompatible rules with the application of sanctions, or if both parties play Active; that
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6 Conclusion
We refer the reader, however, to Sugden (1995) for an innovative and promising approach towards
developing a formal theory of focal points.
is, if parents fail to commit to any set of rules.
The notion that the parties cannot communicate may seem articial. However, in
many bargaining situations it may be possible for the bargainers to commit themselves
to a nal agreement even though they cannot make credible statements in advance about
their willingness to accept particular agreements. (See for instance, Farrell and Gibbon
[1989].)
The principal conclusion arising from our analysis of the meeting place problem is that
specication of the strategy space is all-important. Although this point is trite, it has
frequently been overlooked. For example, game-theoretic analysis of interactions be-
tween rms has focused almost exclusively on interactions specied in terms of quantities
(Cournot) or prices (Bertrand). Considerable attention has been given to renements
of equilibrium notions in situations where such interactions are repeated. Prices and
quantities are obviously salient variables for economists who have spent years analysing
supply-and-demand diagrams. However, it is less clear that they are relevant for business
managers, who are frequently more concerned with variables such as markups (Grant
and Quiggin, 1994), market share and employment levels. Even if businessmen did think
like economists, it seems more natural to conceive of the strategy space in terms of
supply schedules (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989). Although our analysis suggests that
simplistic application of the notion of salience may yield an inadequate representation
of co-ordination problems, it does not diminish the importance of salience in developing
solution concepts. Indeed, consideration of the complexities that arise when there are
multiple salient points gives emphasis to our current limited understanding of the notion
of salience. We do not, however, advocate an immediate attempt to formalise the idea.
Rather, a strategy of active exploration seems appropriate at present.
References
Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory
Econometrica
Rand Journal of Economics,
Economic
Letters
Journal of
Economic Theory
Rand Journal of Economics
Economic Letters
Econometrica
Game Theory and Economic Modelling
The Strategy of Conict
Economic Journal
[1] Binmore, K., 1992. . Lexington, Ma.
[2] Crawford, V. and H. Haller, 1990. \Learning how to cooperate: optimal play in
repeated coordination games," , 58(3), 571-595.
[3] Farrell, J., 1987. \Cheap talk, coordination and entry."
18(1), 34-39.
[4] Farrell, J., 1988. \Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium."
, 33(3), 294-299.
[5] Farrell, J. and R. Gibbons, 1989. \Cheap talk can matter in bargaining."
, 48(1), 221-237.
[6] Farrell, J. and G. Saloner, 1988. \Coordination through committees and markets."
, 19(2), 235-252.
[7] Grant, S. and J. Quiggin, 1994. \Nash Equilbrium with Markup-Pricing
Oligopolists." , 45 , 245-251.
[8] Klemperer, P.D. and M.A. Meyer, 1989. \Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly
under Uncertainty." 57(6), 1243-77.
[9] Kreps, D., 1990. . Oxford University Press,
Oxford, UK.
[10] Schelling, T.C., 1960. . Harvard University Press. Cambridge,
Ma.
[11] Sugden, R., 1995. \A Theory of Focal Points." 105, 533-550.
